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ABSTRACT 
 
 While previous research has documented how the Kalamazoo Promise, the most 
prominent and generous place-based college scholarship program, increased enrollment in 
Kalamazoo Public Schools, this paper qualifies and quantifies the characteristics of students who 
were induced to enter—or stay—in the district.  In particular, it analyzes the origins and 
destinations, socioeconomic composition, and school-level sorting behavior associated with 
student flows around the time of the Promise announcement.  These dimensions are more subtle 
than changes in the volume of students or measures of their individual success, but they are 
equally important to understand for communities exploring the feasibility of place-based 
scholarships as a local economic development tool.  The findings suggest considerable economic 
benefits not just for the school district but for the broader metropolitan area. 
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A Second Look at Enrollment Changes after the Kalamazoo Promise 
 
 
In November of 2005, the superintendent of the Kalamazoo Public Schools (KPS) district 
unveiled the Kalamazoo Promise, a scholarship that provides graduates of the district with up to 
100 percent of tuition and fees at public colleges and universities in Michigan. Among the first 
place-based “universal” scholarships, so called because there are essentially no financial-need or 
academic requirements for eligibility beyond high school graduation, the Promise represents an 
interesting policy tool to strengthen local school systems and communities. Indeed, the existing 
research on its effects has found changes in college choice (Andrews, Desjardins, and Ranchod 
2010), behavior and academic performance in high school (Bartik and Lachowska 2012), and, 
most directly, large increases in district enrollment (Bartik, Eberts, and Huang 2010).1  
In this paper, I take a more in-depth approach to examining the Promise’s effects on 
enrollment. Extending Bartik, Eberts, and Huang’s  (2010) work, the current paper sheds light on 
three aspects of the Promise. First, it seeks to understand the origins of students entering the 
district and the destinations of those who leave it. Employing detailed, individual student data 
from KPS as well as enrollment data from other schools in Michigan, I jointly examine the flows 
of students among KPS, other districts, private schools and charter schools, and the impact of the 
Promise on these flows.2 Because students coming from outside the district are more likely to 
represent new families in the community, they have potentially greater impacts on the economy 
than students who are induced to switch from private or charter schools (but not residential 
locations), and this relates directly to the efficacy of a Promise-like scholarship program on local 
                                                 
1 Bartik, Eberts, and Huang (2010) document that, at the district and grade levels, the entry rate experienced 
a one-time surge in 2006, the first year after the Promise was announced, and a longer-lasting decline in exit rates 
subsequently. 
2 Charter schools have separate administrations and are not part of local education agencies; as such, 
charter school students are ineligible for the Promise. 
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economic development. Second, the paper investigates how the Promise affected the 
socioeconomic composition of students entering and exiting KPS. Student-level proxies for 
family income and scores from Michigan’s standardized exams, the Michigan Educational 
Assessment Program (MEAP), can illustrate which types of students (and their families) are most 
responsive to place-based scholarships. Third, it delves beyond districtwide effects to describe 
enrollment changes at individual schools and attempts to relate these changes to characteristics 
of the schools and entering students. It is possible to study, for example, whether students 
induced to enter KPS by the Promise are more likely to choose a better-performing school, and 
whether this varies by the origin of the student or a proxy of her family income. The degree of 
this type of sorting could affect diversity and inequality of schools and neighborhoods. 
Each of these aspects is important in understanding how the Promise influenced the 
enrollment decisions of different types of students, its impact on migration, and its role on 
spillovers in other school systems. Unfortunately, it is difficult to infer that the effects described 
below are strictly causal. A subset of KPS students were not randomly assigned to the Promise, 
so there can be no within-district comparison, nor are there detailed microdata from a 
comparable district to act as a control group.3 Nevertheless, the analysis represents the best 
attempts to answer these questions with the data available, and the descriptive evidence is 
compelling and supports the argument of Miller-Adams (2009).  
I find that of the 40 percent jump in new KPS students in 2006, between 50 and 60 
percent came from other Michigan school districts, about a quarter came from outside the state, 
and the remainder came from private or charter schools. Among the new entrants from other 
                                                 
3 Because Promise eligibility within KPS is in part based on length of enrollment, it is possible to do some 
within-district analysis for students already in the district (Bartik and Lachowska 2012). But as the focus of this 
paper is on student flows, this source of identification cannot be exploited. 
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Michigan districts that year, a statistical correlation procedure shows that just under 90 percent 
of them can be accounted for by other districts in Kalamazoo County, with a single neighboring 
district responsible for the lion’s share. Exit rates from KPS fell starting in the 2005 school year 
and have remained almost a third lower than in the first half of the 2000s, with this decline 
proportionately spread out by destination. About 80 percent of the drop in students leaving for 
other Michigan districts is due to neighboring districts in the 2005–2006 school year, but this 
share subsequently falls to about half. That is, over time, KPS kept more students (and their 
families) who would have departed for elsewhere in the state outside Kalamazoo County. 
New students to KPS after the Promise was announced were 7 percentage points (10 
percent) less likely to qualify for free or reduced-price lunch than previous new entrants, and 
they also scored higher on the MEAP exam. Whereas the enrollment surge happened only in 
2006, both socioeconomic effects lasted through 2007, illustrating that head counts alone do not 
capture the entire margin of response. These effects were statistically significant and 
economically meaningful, but modest, and the new students more closely resembled their 
incumbent peers rather than the relatively disadvantaged previous cohorts. Although there was 
no difference in lunch assistance for students exiting the district during the year of 
announcement, exiting students in subsequent years were more economically—but not 
academically—advantaged, suggesting that the Promise and the recession may have interacted in 
complex ways. 
Additionally, new students in 2006, despite having higher socioeconomic and academic 
characteristics, were no more likely than new students in the past to choose schools that also 
performed well on these characteristics. Students entering in 2007 (and 2008), however, did 
show positive sorting, but it is difficult to distinguish how much of this change was due to 
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capacity constraints at schools in 2006 relative to improved information about schools’ test 
scores following changes in the MEAP. Nonetheless, there is little evidence of differential 
sorting by student traits. 
The next section of the paper describes in more detail the two main data sources used 
herein. The three following sections explain the methodology and results for each of the three 
topics laid out above. The last section concludes. (There is also an appendix that consists of 
several tables with alternative specifications or analyses that are individually referenced 
throughout the paper.) 
DATA 
 To examine disaggregated enrollment patterns, I use two complementary data sources. 
The primary data set consists of KPS administrative microdata on individual students from 1997 
through 2010 and is an updated version of the same data file used by Bartik, Eberts, and Huang 
(2010, henceforth BEH). These longitudinal data allow the same student to be tracked 
throughout her tenure at KPS and contain basic demographic data, a proxy for family income 
(free or reduced-price lunch status), MEAP standardized test scores, and information on 
enrollment starts, stops, and changes. Crucial for this study, the enrollment data provide entry 
and exit codes that indicate whether the student is new to the district or is continuing on, as well 
as whether she left in the middle of the school year. For new entrants, the codes ascertain her 
origin: another Michigan (public) school district, a private school, a charter school, from outside 
the state, and other sources. For students who left midyear, the codes provide similar detail for 
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the destination; if a student left between school years, however, one cannot observe where she 
went.4 
The KPS microdata are supplemented with aggregate data on enrollment from other 
schools and school districts in Michigan. The Center for Educational Performance and 
Information (CEPI), part of Michigan’s state budget office, has collected data on fall and spring 
head counts of students for each public school in the state (including charter schools) at the race-
grade-gender level since 1991. For private schools, it has collected these data for each grade (but 
not gender or race) on an annual basis since 2001.5 These data can be linked to the detailed entry 
and exit counts from KPS to shed light on the specific districts (or charter or private schools) 
from which new KPS students come and to which exiting students depart, and the impact the 
Promise had on these relationships. 
ORIGIN AND DESTINATION FLOWS 
Overall Counts and Rates 
Before analyzing the origins and destinations of KPS students before and after the 
Promise, I first replicate and update the findings from BEH that the number of new entrants 
experienced a one-time surge in the fall of 2006, the first year after the Promise was announced, 
and that exit rates fell and continued to remain low. Figure 1 plots the number of new entrants to 
KPS as of the official count day, by grade, for three time periods: the average for 2003 through 
2005, 2006, and the average for 2007 through 2010. There are three things worth noting. First, 
                                                 
4 Just over half of exiters in kindergarten through grade 11 left between school years. 
5 While the Common Core of Data from the U.S. Department of Education contains public school 
enrollment, race-grade-gender breakdowns are not available. Similarly, the Private School Survey contains private 
school enrollment, but these data are biennial and contain only grade aggregates (elementary or secondary), and 
even these have high non-report rates. 
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the number of new entrants generally declines as the grade rises, with the exception of 9th grade; 
this reflects an influx of students from charter and private schools, most of which top out at 8th 
grade. Second, the series for 2006 is substantially elevated relative to the earlier period in grades 
1–9, but not grades 10–12.6 As BEH have written, this pattern is strongly suggestive of the 2006 
surge being due primarily to the Promise, as eligibility for the scholarship required students to be 
enrolled in KPS since at least 9th grade. Third, the series for the post-Promise period lies almost 
directly on top of the pre-Period. This is also commensurate with a Promise effect, as there is no 
evidence of any secular trend that would otherwise cause the number of new entrants to rise over 
time. 
Figure 2, on the other hand, shows exit rates. The exit rate is defined to be the fraction of 
students in KPS on a given fall count day who are not in KPS the following count day. Thus, the 
Promise year in this figure is 2005 rather than 2006. For grades K–8, exit rates fall by 
approximately one-third during the first year of the Promise announcement, and they stay at the 
reduced level over the next four years. For the high school grades, the pattern is slightly 
different. For the 2005–2006 retention year, the exit rate is substantially less than the average 
over the previous three years; for the subsequent four years, however, the exit rate has risen to a 
level between the initial Promise year and the preperiod.7 I discuss this feature below. 
Inflows and Outflows 
Turning to the sources of the inflows of new students, Figures 3 and 4 show the 
distribution, by origin, of new KPS students in the pre-Promise period and the first year after the 
                                                 
6 There is also a similar jump in total kindergarten enrollment; this is not shown in the figure because 
kindergarten represents first school entry for many students, while others (primarily low income) attended pre-
kindergarten through KPS. Thus, defining the origin of a “new” kindergarten student is not straightforward. 
7 Appendix Figures 1 and 2 repeat Figures 1 and 2 showing a separate series for each year. The latter 
appendix figure shows that the rise in exit rates for grades 9–11 has not been monotonic but is rather fluctuating 
from year to year. 
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Promise was announced. The number of new entrants was approximately 480, or 40 percent, 
higher in 2006 than averaged over 2003–2005.8 While just under half of new students came from 
other Michigan school districts in the preperiod, slightly over half did so in 2006. Approximately 
a quarter came from outside the state in both periods, with entrants from charter schools (14 to 
12 percent) and private schools (4 to 5 percent) amounting for smaller shares. Interestingly, the 
fraction from “other” sources, a residual category that mostly picks up students returning from 
the juvenile justice system or reentering after having dropped out, falls by four percentage 
points.9 
While these figures show that the overall composition of entrants changed only slightly 
(albeit statistically significantly, χ2[5] = 32.3, p < 0.001), with a slight increase in the share 
coming from other districts in the state, they belie the number of new students from each source. 
Table 1 provides these numbers, by grade. The first two panels contain the volume of entrants for 
each period, while the third panel provides their difference. Across grades 1–12, the number of 
new students from other Michigan districts increased by 303 students, or more than 50 percent. 
Out-of-state entrants jumped by 122 students, or 44 percent.  Fewer new students came from 
private or charter schools, both in the mid-30s, although because the preperiod volume from 
private schools was small to begin with, the percentage increase was still 70 percent; charter 
school students increased by only 21 percent. New students from other sources actually declined 
slightly by 16 students. The last panel shows the marginal change in the distribution of entrants; 
that is, of the share of additional new students in 2006, where did they come from? More than 
three-fifths of the influx were from other Michigan districts, and fully a quarter were from out of 
                                                 
8 The official enrollment count for the district increased by 1,052 students between fall of 2006 and fall of 
2005, but as BEH have noted, about half of this increase was due to fewer students leaving. 
9 It turns out that the number coming from this category barely changes, even though the proportion falls. 
This is discussed further below. 
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state. Thus nearly 90 percent of the students entering KPS in 2006, over and above the average 
of the prior three years, were not local but physically moved into the district.10 
Understanding outflows of students is more complicated, as the destination type is 
observed only for students who left midyear. Nonetheless, the decline in exit rates post-Promise 
seems to have been roughly proportionately distributed, as Figures 5 and 6 illustrate: the overall 
composition of exit by reason is little changed over time (although, again, the difference is 
statistically significant: χ2[7] = 65.5, p < 0.001). Districtwide, the exit rate for grades K–11 fell 
from 17.9 percent over 2002–2004 to 12.7 percent from 2005 through 2009, or between 400 and 
450 fewer students leaving per year. As shown in Table 3, of the 5.2 percentage-point decline, 60 
percent was due to a reduction in students leaving between school years, and 25 percent was due 
to a reduction in students leaving for other districts in Michigan mid-year. Both of these marginal 
percentage declines are slightly larger than the preperiod average shown in Figure 6, which is 
why their average shares decline slightly. Interestingly, the fraction of the decline that was due to 
between-year movers for grades 6 and 8 (the last grades before transition to middle school and 
high school over most of the time period) was nearly 75 percent, indicating that the Promise may 
have induced more of these students to stay in the district rather than leave at a natural break 
point .11 
                                                 
10 This assumes that the three-year preperiod average serves as an adequate comparison. If the numbers of 
new entrants by source were trending up (down), the comparing the 2006 year to the preperiod average would bias 
the change upward (downward). A crude way to allow for this possibility is create a counterfactual for 2006 based 
on predictions from a linear trend, for each grade and source, over the period 2000–2005. The results are shown in 
Appendix Table 1. The net increase in new students is nearly 60 students larger than in Table 1, with most of the 
additions coming from charter and private schools (these had been trending downward). The conclusion that the vast 
majority of the increase in new entrants came from students outside the district, however, is unaltered. Appendix 
Table 2 provides averages over the earlier period of 1998–2002. 
11 Most of the elementary schools in KPS had grade ranges of K–6 until the fall of 2009, when 6th grade 
transitioned entirely to middle school. Constructing the exit rate only for 6th graders who would transition to middle 
school does not appreciably change the fraction of the decline due to between-year movers. 
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Table 3 assumes that exit rates by grade did not change in years following the 
announcement of the Promise. Figure 2 demonstrated there was no reason to doubt this 
assumption for grades 1–8, but it did not hold so well for the high school grades. Separate 
decompositions for the 2005 and 2006–2009 years confirmed that the composition of the exit 
rate decline was not appreciably different in these periods for the nonsecondary grades. They 
also revealed why the exit rates climbed for the later grades. The increase in 9th grade was 
widespread among the constituent parts; there were higher rates of interdistrict and interstate 
migration midyear, exiting between years, and dropout. The shift for 10th and 11th grades, 
however, was not due at all to intrayear migration, but was instead due to a slight rise in the 
dropout rate, a commensurate rise in the early graduation rate, and interyear migration. The most 
likely explanation for this behavior is that during the initial year of the Promise announcement, 
there was an enhanced option value for students on the margin of graduating to stay enrolled in 
the district to get a better sense of their chances at graduation (an excitement effect). While some 
of these students stayed and graduated (perhaps after repeating a grade), others realized it would 
be to no avail and subsequently dropped out—that is, some of the rise in exit rates was due to 
delayed graduation and dropout. 
The Role of Neighboring Districts 
Taken in total, the data on inflows and outflows by reason imply that the vast majority of 
the surge in enrollment in KPS following the Promise announcement was due to attracting—and 
keeping—students from outside the district boundaries, with a much smaller share relating to 
flows in and out of private and charter schools. While data limitations preclude us from saying 
much about out-of-state students, the CEPI data on enrollment in other Michigan school districts 
can help us understand transitions between KPS and specific donor and receiver districts. As 
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neighboring districts in particular tend to compete for students (and especially in a state like 
Michigan, where education finance is highly state-dependent), a district-level analysis can reveal 
the extent to whether new entrants come primarily from close-by districts, as well as which types 
of districts are most affected. 
One way to investigate changes in the relationship between enrollments in KPS and other 
districts is to estimate the following equation: 
𝐸𝑔𝑦
𝐾𝑃𝑆 =  𝜏𝑔 + ∑ ∆𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑗𝑔𝑦𝑗 𝛽𝑗 + ∑ 𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑥 ∆𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑗𝑔𝑦𝑗 𝛾𝑗 + ∑ 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑥 ∆𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑗𝑔𝑦𝑗 𝛿𝑗 +  𝜀𝑔𝑦, (1)  
where 𝐸𝑔𝑦𝐾𝑃𝑆 is the number of new entrants to (exits from) KPS from (to) other Michigan districts 
in a given grade g and year y (and is taken from the KPS microdata); 𝜏𝑔 are grade-specific 
dummies; ∆𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑗𝑔𝑦 is the change in enrollment in grade g between year y and y − 1 in district j; 
𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚 is a variable that equals 1 in 2006 and 0 otherwise; and 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚 is a variable that equals 1 
after 2006 and 0 otherwise. The parameter 𝛽𝑗 represents how the number of entrants (exits) to 
KPS changes, averaged across grades, when enrollment in district j increases by one from the 
previous year, in years before 2006. That is, each 𝛽𝑗 describes the association between changes 
in enrollment in a specific comparison district and that in KPS in the pre-Promise period. The 
coefficients 𝛾𝑗describe how these associations change during 2006, the first school year after the 
Promise’s announcement; similarly, the 𝛿𝑗 describe how the associations change in subsequent 
years (2007 forward) relative to the preperiod. 
 When 𝐸𝑔𝑦𝐾𝑃𝑆consists of new entrants, 𝛾𝑗 are the coefficients of interest. While the factors 
influencing enrollment changes among all the school districts may be quite complex, under the 
assumption that this relationship did not suddenly change in 2006—other than because of the 
Promise—negative estimates of 𝛾𝑗indicate from which districts new KPS entrants in 2006 came. 
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For exits, both 𝛾𝑗and 𝛿𝑗 are interesting, as exit patterns may have changed over time, but the 
interpretation in this case is that positive estimates are associated with districts receiving fewer 
students from KPS.12 While it would be ideal to run Equation (1) with all other Michigan school 
districts on the right-hand side, this is not feasible, as there simply are not enough observations to 
identify all of the parameters. Although it is somewhat restrictive, I limit the school districts 
included in estimation of (1) to the eight with coverage in Kalamazoo County.13 Economic theory 
predicts that students in these districts would be most affected by the Promise, as their close 
proximity would mean that a) they would be more likely to have heard about the Promise; b) 
moving would be less expensive; and c) parents would generally not have to change jobs. The 
exercise is thus meant to be illustrative, and it unfortunately cannot apportion how many of the 
in-state movers were from the surrounding area and how many were from farther away. 
 When Equation (1) was estimated for years 1998–2010 on grades K–12, the null 
hypothesis that 𝛿𝑗 = 0 could not be statistically rejected for any district j, nor were any of the 𝛿𝑗 
of a nontrivial magnitude. This is consistent with the aggregate series of new entrants in Figure 1 
being indistinguishable in the pre- and postperiods. In order to improve precision, the constraint 
that 𝛿𝑗 = 0 was imposed and the equation reestimated. The results from this procedure are shown 
in Table 4, with column 1 representing 𝛾𝚥� from the specification that includes all grades K–12.  
Of the eight districts, all but two estimates are negative, and of these, three are statistically 
significant and of a meaningful magnitude. The coefficient estimates for Climax-Scotts, 
Comstock, and Galesburg-Augusta (all to the east of KPS) range from −0.66 to −1.27, indicating 
that, relative to the pre-2006 period, for every one student decline in enrollment in these districts, 
                                                 
12 Since the number of exiters from KPS fell after the Promise and enrollment in other districts would be 
expected to fall if fewer students entered from KPS, there should be a positive relationship between the two. 
13 These include the KRESA districts,  essentially a county-level overdistrict that provides pooled services. 
Of the nine districts in KRESA, KPS is the largest throughout the time period. 
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KPS attracted 0.66 to 1.27 students from them.14 Table 4 also shows the net change in enrollment 
in the neighboring districts between 2005 and 2006. Although, Parchment and Portage 
experienced large falls in enrollment, the estimates of 𝛾𝚥� for these districts reveal that the declines 
were not unusual enough to imply that 2006 marked a break from previous vicissitudes. The 
Vicksburg district, although experiencing an enrollment decline, shows a statistically significant 
positive coefficient, suggesting that its correlation with other districts in the region is subtle and 
complicated.  
Column 2 of the table leaves out kindergarten, as this grade represents first entry into any 
formal school for a large number of students and thus identification for whether they came from 
other districts is not clear. These results are reasonably robust to those in column 1, although the 
statistical significance weakens for Climax-Scotts, a very small district, and Vicksburg. To get a 
better sense of what these estimates mean in practical terms, I perform a simple decomposition 
that relates 𝛾𝚥� to the change in enrollment and the total number of new entrants to KPS from 
neighboring districts in 2006. That is, the estimates in column 1 (or column 2) are multiplied by 
the respective district’s change in enrollment from 2005 to 2006, and these products are 
compared to the new entrants to KPS from other MI districts, beyond the historical average (see 
Table 1).15 The shares of the new KPS entrants accounted by the neighboring districts are shown 
in columns 3 and 4. The Comstock district accounts for the vast majority of new entrants to KPS, 
either 102 percent for the specification based on all grades, or 82 percent for the one that 
excludes kindergarten; it is an order of magnitude larger than any other district. Given their small 
                                                 
14 Note that estimates of 𝛾𝑗can be below −1 if students who would have entered district j before 2006 now 
enter KPS instead. 
15 Strictly speaking, this number in Table 1 (303) is not the right comparison, as it is relative to the average 
over 2003–2005, not 1998–2005 as calculated in the regression. Over the longer time period, the difference is 321, 
and this statistic is used in column 3 of Table 4. 
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sizes, it is perhaps not surprising that Climax-Scotts and Schoolcraft contribute little toward new 
KPS entrants, but Portage, with its relatively large enrollment and large drop in 2006, also plays 
a small role. Both Galesburg-Augusta and Parchment see small increases in their shares under 
the specification that excludes kindergarten, together accounting for just under one-fifth of the 
total. Across the eight districts, nearly 90 percent of the influx of students in 2006 can be 
explained, and this is after accounting for the negative shares in some of the districts. These high 
aggregate shares are consistent with the story above that close-by districts would be the most 
likely to be affected by the Promise. 
While these estimates suggest that KPS attracted students from neighboring districts in 
2006, they come with some caveats. First, it is not possible to determine separately how many of 
the students attracted to KPS physically left one of the other county districts and how many were 
induced to come from elsewhere in the state directly to KPS instead of another county district. 
Second, the marginal correlation analysis shows changes relative to pre-Promise trends, when 
KPS was losing enrollment to neighboring districts (BEH 2010). Third, these relationships based 
on entrants (or exits, as discussed below) show the effects only on school enrollment; they do not 
address the potential for broader economic effects to the entire metro area.16 
Turning to the count of exits, Equation (1) was estimated on grades K–11 with the 
dependent variable equal to the sum of students exiting from KPS to other Michigan school 
districts midyear and those exiting between years. This is not ideal, as some students exiting 
between years left public education in Michigan altogether, but it is likely that the majority of 
students leaving for neighboring districts did so between years rather than midyear, and so they 
are included. Table 5 presents the estimates of 𝛾𝑗and 𝛿𝑗, as well as their differences, in 
                                                 
16 For example, the influx of out-of-state residents and their families likely boosted demand for local goods 
and services, the effects of which would extend beyond school district boundaries. 
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supercolumn (1). During the first year after the Promise, the association between KPS exits and 
enrollment changes strengthened in six of the eight districts, with most being statistically 
significant. The point estimate for Comstock is again quite large in magnitude at 2.28, indicating 
that, relative to 2005 and before, a one-student drop in enrollment was associated with 2.28 
fewer students heading there from KPS. Drops were also pronounced in Climax-Scotts (0.95) 
and Galesburg-Augusta (0.79), but the relation actually went in the opposite direction for Portage 
(−0.49) and Vicksburg (−1.65). In these latter two districts, drops in enrollment were associated 
with KPS sending more students to them in 2006. Interestingly, the patterns change substantially 
in the years following the Promise’s announcement, as shown by the column for 𝛿𝚥� . These point 
estimates are uniformly smaller in magnitude than 𝛾𝚥� , with half positive and negative, and most 
are not statistically different from zero. Indeed, the signs change from positive to negative for 
Galesburg-Augusta, Gull Lake, and Parchment, and from negative to positive for Portage. The 
case of Portage is particularly revealing, as both 𝛾𝚥�  and 𝛿𝚥�  are significantly different from zero 
(as is their difference), implying that while KPS sent more students to Portage in 2006 than it had 
historically, over the next four years it sent substantially fewer. This and other reversals highlight 
the complex and dynamic nature of the decision to exit KPS: the hypothesis that the effects are 
the same in both the first and later years is rejected in five individual districts as well as jointly 
for all eight. 
It follows that the role of these districts in explaining the reduction in outflows also 
changed over the post-Promise period. Thus, columns 3 and 4 perform an exercise similar to that 
in Table 4, wherein the contributions of each district toward the total reduction in exits from KPS 
are calculated. Column 3 shows these shares for 2006 and column 4 for the period 2006–2010. In 
general, the pattern in column 3 is quite close to the one in Table 4: the same districts that 
15 
received fewer students from KPS the first school year after the Promise were the ones that sent 
more students to KPS, with Comstock alone accounting for the whole fraction, on net. The other 
eight KRESA districts jointly accounted for 80 percent of the reduction in KPS exits to other 
Michigan districts that year. However, the profile is different in the later years, with Portage 
accounting for a quarter of the reduced exits, and Comstock for (only) another fifth. The share 
explained by the districts as a whole fell to 53 percent, suggesting that the share of the 
subsequent reduction in KPS exits due to nonlocal districts in the state has grown over time. In 
the following section, I investigate the compositional changes of entering and exiting students 
around the time of the Promise to better understand these dynamics. 
COMPOSITION 
Free and Reduced-Price Lunch Status 
 The data available to study changes in the socioeconomic distribution of students entering 
and exiting KPS, even in the administrative files, are limited. One of these metrics, commonly 
used in the education literature, is whether the student qualifies for free or reduced-price lunch.17 
As in many urban school districts, a majority of KPS students are relatively low income and are 
served by this program—about 60 percent over the period 2003−2010. This average participation 
rate fluctuates with economic conditions (noticeably rising as the Great Recession begins), but it 
is also affected by the flow of students into and out of the district. The previous section showed 
that during the year after the Promise was announced, the origins of entering students changed. 
                                                 
17 Under the National School Lunch Program, administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, students 
at participating schools (which include nearly the universe of schools) qualify for a free lunch if their family 
incomes are less than 130 percent of the federal poverty threshold; if their family incomes are between 130 and 185 
percent of the poverty threshold, they qualify for a reduced-price lunch of $0.40. In KPS, of students who qualify for 
either program, about 90 percent qualify for free lunch. 
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Did their socioeconomic characteristics change as well? There is good reason to expect they 
might have. The benefit of the Promise is greater for students who go to the four-year 
universities in the state, and greater still for those who go to most selective universities 
(Michigan State University and the University of Michigan). Because the likelihood of attending 
selective four-year colleges rises sharply with family socioeconomic status, even when moving 
from the bottom quartile to the second quartile (Bailey and Dynarski 2011), the Promise may 
have reduced the share of new students who would be on free or reduced-price lunch. 
 Figure 7A presents time trends in the share of KPS students on free or reduced-price 
lunch, separately for entering and continuing students. The top left panel aggregates students 
from grades 1–12. In 2003 and 2004, new students were economically more disadvantaged than 
incumbents, with a 10-percentage-point greater share receiving lunch assistance. However, the 
gap between the two began to converge in 2005, before the Promise announcement, as the 
relative disadvantage of new entrants fell sharply. In 2006 and 2007, new entrants were actually 
slightly advantaged relative to continuing students (although the difference is not statistically 
significant); from 2008 on, both groups show steep increases due to the recession. The overall 
pattern is not inconsistent with the Promise attracting wealthier students in 2006, but the decline 
from 2004 to 2005, which is almost as large as that from 2005 to 2006, complicates 
interpretation. It is possible that the earlier decline is symptomatic of mean reversion—the new 
entrants series rises between 2003 and 2004, and the subsequent change could be a statistical 
fluctuation around a mean of about 0.7. It is also possible that the same factor that caused the 
decline in 2005 was also in effect in 2006, diminishing the role of the Promise. Without a longer 
pre-trend, which the data do not allow, it is difficult to determine from the graph which is more 
plausible. 
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 Nevertheless, there are a few other pieces of evidence that hint that the effects are indeed 
Promise-related. One of these is in the middle-left panel, which shows the time trend for 
kindergarten. (Because kindergarten is the start of universal public schooling, all kindergarten 
students are counted as new.18) Unlike for grades 1–12, the drop in the share for kindergarten is 
exclusively a 2005–2006 event, with the lunch rate falling 7 percentage points. Here, the pattern 
for years 2003–2005 suggests random fluctuation around a stable mean. As entrance to KPS in 
kindergarten is required to gain the maximum benefit of the Promise, one would expect to see 
the largest incentive effects in that grade. More support for a Promise effect can be found in 
Figure A3 in Appendix A, which breaks down the lunch time-series by grade. The most 
pronounced declines in 2006 are in grades 1 and 2, and to a lesser extent grade 7. Again, the 
earlier grades have greater potential benefit from the Promise, so one would expect to find a 
larger effect there; the grade 7 decline in 2006 may be due to it being the usual beginning of 
middle school in KPS and surrounding districts that year—it is easier to change districts when 
one would change schools anyway. Notably, there is no evidence of a decline among new 
entrants in 2006 in grades 10–12, a group that is ineligible for the Promise. 
 The lower-left panel of Figure 7A combines all grades K–12. Because kindergarteners 
account for more than 40 percent of total new entrants in most years, they disproportionately 
affect the series for that group. In the combined panel, the sudden drop in assisted lunch status 
between 2005 and 2006 is readily apparent, even as the rate rises slightly for incumbent students. 
It is interesting that the new-student rate remains low in 2007: although the quantity surge of new 
students into KPS was a one-time event in 2006 (Figure 1), compositional differences of new 
                                                 
18 About a quarter of kindergarten students have preexisting records in KPS; of these, 90 percent were in 
prekindergarten or child care programs for low-income students and the remainder were previously in kindergarten. 
Restricting the sample to kindergarteners without a preexisting KPS record reduces the level of the series in Figure 7 
by 3 percentage points each year but negligibly affects the pattern of changes. 
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students may have been more persistent. The beginning of the recession in 2008 makes it 
difficult to say how much more persistent, though, as it is not clear how much of the rise in the 
rate for new entrants is due to return to trend and how much is recession-driven.19,20 In any case, 
it is worth mentioning that the changes in rates seen in the figure are not an artifact of changes in 
racial or gender composition. When the distribution of gender, ethnicity, and grade levels are 
held constant over time, as in the right column, the patterns of the time series are unaltered.21 In 
summary, there was a moderate reduction in the free and reduced-price lunch rate of new 
students in 2006, especially relative to incumbent students, and this drop was particularly 
focused among the youngest grades. This provides cautionary evidence that the Promise did 
induce modest, positive socioeconomic selection among new students for a brief time. 
 But what about exiting students? The same logic as for entering students could apply, 
which would imply that exiting students could be poorer following the Promise announcement. 
On the other hand, students from more affluent families likely have more options (or stronger 
preferences) to choose higher-performing districts than their less economically fortunate peers, 
and the Promise may thus have had greater retention effects among relatively poorer students.22 
Figure 7B shows that this latter explanation seems to better fit the data. Although exiting 
students are 7–8 percentage points more likely to be on assisted lunch than continuing students 
                                                 
19 The relatively steep increase between 2007 and 2008 for new entrants is partially due to the closing of 
Kalamazoo Advantage Academy, a charter school serving a nearly exclusively low-income, high-minority 
population, after 2007 and the entrance of most of these students into KPS. Excluding these students produces 
results very similar to the reweighted trends shown in the second column of Figure 7. 
20 The next section on MEAP scores also suggests positive selection of new entrants through 2007, but not 
beyond. 
21 In additional analysis by demographic characteristic, no appreciable differences were found in the time 
series by gender, although the decline in lunch assistance in 2006 was nearly twice as large for whites as it was for 
blacks. 
22 This logic may seem to be at odds with that for attracting wealthier entering students, but it need not be. 
Households headed by a college graduate are likely to have greater income and be more geographically mobile than 
less-educated households (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2011). Thus, they may be more likely to move in to and 
move out of KPS in the wake of the Promise. 
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before the Promise announcement, the rate for the former groups falls shortly in the 2006–2007 
and 2007–2008 school years, to a level below that of staying students. Interestingly, there is no 
change in the 2005–2006 school year. This could mean that some families took a wait-and-see 
approach initially, effectively postponing their decision to move for a year. However, there are 
two complications in interpreting these results. First, the reduction in lunch assistance among 
exiters is concentrated among midyear leavers—students exiting between school years become 
poorer in 2006 and 2007. This pattern would generally not accord with wealthier families 
postponing moving. Second, while the assisted lunch rate rises gradually for continuing students 
from 2007 on, as would be expected due to the Great Recession, the rate for exiting spikes 
abruptly in 2009, which is somewhat puzzling. While Figure 7B suggests exiters were more 
positively selected after the Promise (at least through 2008), the data are not clear as to how or 
why, and further investigation is warranted. 
MEAP scores 
 Another metric for looking at changes in composition is more directly tied to 
achievement—students’ MEAP scores in reading and math. This measure has advantages and 
disadvantages relative to the lunch status measure as a proxy for a student’s background. One 
advantage is conceptual: MEAP scores more directly measure academic aptitude than income-
based measures, and there is strong correlation with higher scores and high school graduation 
and college-going.23 A second advantage is practical: unlike the binary lunch measure, MEAP 
scores are continuous and exhibit much more variation across students, allowing a finer level of 
detail into composition. However, there are also several shortcomings. First, they are not as 
                                                 
23 A one-standard deviation increase on the MEAP, averaged across grades, is associated with a 17-
percentage-point increase in the likelihood that a typical 12thgrader will graduate and enroll in college. 
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widely available as lunch status. The MEAP test was redesigned beginning in 2005, so there is a 
much more limited pre-Promise period against which to evaluate trends. (Indeed, the lack of a 
preperiod forestalls using MEAP scores to analyze compositional changes of exiting students.) 
Second, the test is given only in grades 3—8, so sample sizes are smaller. Third, as a high-stakes 
test (it is used for accountability under No Child Left Behind), it is potentially manipulable, 
although the analytical strategy used should mitigate this issue. Altogether, it is a useful 
complement to lunch status in assessing how composition of student flows changed around the 
time of the Promise. 
 The MEAP scores that students receive (and that are in our data) are reported as scaled 
scores, which are designed to have statewide means that rise by (approximately) 100 each grade 
and a standard deviation of 25 within each grade. In order to make the scores comparable across 
time and grades, I transform them into effect sizes relative to the 2005 distribution. That is, I 
subtract from each score the statewide grade-specific mean in 2005 and then divide by 25. The 
result shows how many standard deviation units away a student is from the average student in the 
state in the same grade in 2005. 
 Figure 8 presents four panels of trends in average standardized MEAP scores from 2005 
to 2010. (For each of these years, the MEAP was administered in October, shortly after the 
beginning of the school year.) Each panel contains a series for new entrants (those entering KPS 
in the year shown) and for stayers, students who were enrolled on the previous year’s count day. 
The most obvious feature in the figure is the steady overall rise in MEAP scores over time—this 
phenomenon has been documented by BEH (their Table 6), who show also that this increase was 
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not unique to KPS but was a statewide trend.24 The rise may reflect real gains in achievement or 
it may reflect greater teaching to the test, but by comparing new entrants to stayers within a time 
period, this issue can largely be sidestepped by effectively netting out the overall time trend.25 
The top two panels show scores for math (left) and reading (right). In both cases, the scores of 
new entrants in 2005—before the Promise was announced—are about 0.12 standard deviations 
below the scores for stayers, and these differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. In 2006, scores rise for both groups but do so faster for new entrants. For math, the gap 
narrows to 0.04 standard deviations, and for reading it narrows to 0.01 standard deviations; 
neither is statistically significant. Interestingly, scores for new students remain relatively high in 
2007 before dropping sharply in 2008 and remain below stayers’ through 2010. While this 
pattern is consistent with a short-lived, Promise-induced effect on positive selection into KPS in 
2006 and 2007, without a longer pre-Promise trend it is hard to be confident that another factor is 
not at play.26 The bottom row presents similar trends but adjusts the data to hold the composition 
of students fixed in terms of grade, sex, ethnicity, and lunch status. This procedure mitigates, but 
does not eliminate, the faster growth of new entrants between 2005 and 2007; while about half of 
the positive selection in 2006 and 2007 is due to these observables, another half remains 
unexplained.27  
 While the trends in means provide a useful summary, they do not provide a complete 
picture of how selection changed across the entire MEAP score distribution. For example, the 
                                                 
24 BEH provide suggestive evidence that this trend was less pronounced for a set of urban school districts 
with characteristics similar to KPS. 
25 Also, because the exams take place about six weeks after the school year begins, it is unlikely that the 
score of new entrants are significantly affected by instruction in KPS; rather, they more likely reflect composition of 
entering students. 
26 If the Promise is the driving factor, it is interesting that although the quantity of new students in 2007 is 
not elevated, the “quality” is. 
27 The observable component with the largest effect  is the change in lunch status, as documented above. 
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mean of entering students can rise because more students come from the upper part of the 
distribution rather than the middle, or it could rise because more students come from the middle 
part of the distribution rather than the bottom. Knowing the type of selection is important not 
only because it has implications for average yearly progress under accountability programs, but 
also because it speaks to the levels of students (or their families) that are most affected by 
Promise programs.28 Figures 9 and 10 thus examine the entire distribution of MEAP scores for 
math and reading. In both figures, the top left panel shows the difference in density between new 
entrants and returning students in 2005. Positive values indicate that new entrants were more 
likely to have the given score (on the x-axis) relative to returning students, and vice versa.  
For both math and reading, there is significant positive mass between −4 and −2 and 
negative mass between 0.6 and 2.2.29 Because the units are scaled to the statewide (standard 
normal) distribution in 2005, this means that new entrants relative to continuing students in 2005 
were disproportionately focused in the bottom 5 percent of the state distribution at the expense of 
the top third. The remaining five panels show how the density in the top left panel changed in 
each subsequent year, relative to the base year of 2005. That is, they are the distribution 
equivalent of differences-in-differences. The top right panel, for instance, shows that, relative to 
2005, the gap between new entrants and stayers narrowed in 2006 because of an influx of 
students with scores between 0 and 2, nearly the entire upper half of the distribution. For math, 
there is a decline both in the extreme lower tail and between −1 and 0, while the decline is more 
diffused across the bottom half for reading. The interpretation is that the first year after the 
Promise, the faster growth in MEAP scores of new entrants was due to proportionally more of 
                                                 
28 In Michigan, proficiency is determined by scores exceeding a threshold, so changes within either side of 
this threshold would not affect proficiency, even though they would affect the mean. 
29 Adding up the positive and negative mass yields zero; adding up the mass weighted by the score, of 
course, yields the mean difference of −0.12 shown in Figure 8. 
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these students coming from high up in the statewide distribution, roughly at the 85th percentile, 
and not from the middle.30 Since students scoring in this range typically go to (and graduate 
from) four-year colleges (Bailey and Dynarski 2011), this makes sense, as these students have 
the most to gain financially from the Promise. 
 The pattern of change is quite different for later years. Although means continued to rise 
faster for new entrants relative to stayers in 2007, the center-left panel shows that this growth 
represented a shift from the bottom to the middle of the distribution, and this was somewhat 
more pronounced for math than reading. To the extent that the Promise induced students and 
their families to move into KPS, these patterns suggest that the higher-ability students moved 
sooner while middle-ability students (still higher than the KPS average) held off for a year. This 
could be rationalized if it took middle-ability students and their families longer to learn about the 
Promise, if there was more uncertainty about their college intentions, or if their mobility was 
more income-constrained—all of which are plausible. Fall of 2008 marked the financial crisis, 
and there is strong negative selection of new entrants that year, with large mass gains between −2 
and 0. The last two years show more mass in the center and less in the tails, but there is little 
overall change in selection. 
 But how much of these mass changes are due to changes in composition in sex, ethnicity, 
grade, and particularly lunch status? The semiparametric reweighting procedure proposed by 
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), can help answer that question. In essence, the DiNardo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux procedure uses propensity weights to make one group resemble another. In 
this case, the weights are designed to make returning students in each year from 2006 through 
2010 resemble returning students in 2005 along the four dimensions mentioned above; the same 
                                                 
30 This is relative to the statewide distribution. Because KPS has a lower mean than the state, the new 
entrants are coming from higher than the 85th percentile of the KPS score distribution. 
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process is repeated for new entrants. The results of this exercise are shown in Figures 11 and 12. 
The top-left panel in both figures is the same as before, but the other panels have been adjusted. 
For years 2007–2010, the changes are relatively small, and the patterns of increases or decreases 
in mass are preserved from the raw data for both math and reading. For 2006, however, the 
reweighted mass changes are more striking: the positive mass that had been centered around a 
score of 1 is somewhat smaller, the negative mass around 0 is somewhat larger, and the relatively 
flat region between −2 and −1 (or −2.5 to −1.5 for reading) now has significant positive mass. 
 In context, this tells us that selection through the observable demographic channels 
(mostly lunch status) was most predominant the first year after the Promise announcement. The 
reduction in the relative share of students on free or reduced-price lunch among new students 
that year was associated with a sizable movement in the score density from around the 10th 
statewide percentile to the 85th percentile. Even holding the demographics fixed, the increase in 
density at a score greater than 1, not repeated in any other year, demonstrates that the positive 
selection on unobservables of new entrants that year was concentrated among high-performing 
students.31 Furthermore, that adjusting for demographic composition affects the 2006 change in 
density appreciably, but minimally so for the other years, lends credence that the Promise itself, 
and not other factors, was behind the immediate change.32 
 Taking the lunch status and MEAP score results in concert, there is a fair amount of 
evidence that the Promise influenced the socioeconomic and academic composition of students 
entering and leaving KPS. In both dimensions, new students became more positively selected 
                                                 
31 These unobservables could include more extensive measures of family background, including parental 
education, wealth, intrinsic motivation, and other factors known to correlate with test scores. 
32 Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) develop methods for bounding the selection on unobservables relative to 
selection on observables. While possible, it seems unlikely that chance would strongly influence change in 
observables one year but not any of the others. 
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after the Promise announcement, although this effect was modest: in general, new matriculants 
more closely resembled incumbent students rather than appearing relatively disadvantaged to 
them, as they had previously. While this selection was short lived, it persisted through 2007, 
unlike the boost in the quantity of new entrants. Students who left KPS after the Promise 
announcement were less likely to be poor than previously, and because fewer students were 
leaving overall, there was slight negative selection among stayers, the effect of which seems to 
have lasted through 2008. However, the later timing of this trend makes it harder to infer it was 
due to the Promise and not some other factor; indeed, this negative economic selection was not 
apparent at all in MEAP test scores, though limited pre-Promise data make it difficult to 
conclude much in this case.  
SCHOOL-LEVEL EFFECTS 
Since the inflow of new students in the two years after the Promise announcement 
appears to have been positively selected, it is natural to ask whether the schools these new 
students chose to attend were also positively selected. That is, did the new students (or their 
parents) disproportionately seek out schools in KPS that had aggregate statistics above average 
for the district in terms of MEAP scores or lunch status? The answer has implications for 
neighborhood-level development: if there is positive sorting, then already-advantaged schools 
(relatively speaking) will grow more so, and school catchment areas that struggle will be less 
likely to benefit. While economic theory would predict positive sorting under full information, it 
is possible that parents may not be well-informed about which schools have high test scores and 
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more affluent students—particularly if they come from farther away—or that neighborhood 
housing markets or school capacity limits impede desired school choice.33 
I examine the extent of positive sorting through a multinomial logit model, which allows 
the choice of school to be a function of characteristics of the student.34 More specifically, let 
school choice among new students be modeled as 
Pr[𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗] = 𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝛼𝑗 +  𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜹𝒋�∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼𝑘 +  𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜹𝒌)𝑘 ,                                                                                          (2) 
where Pr[𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗] is the probability that new student i chooses school j in year t, 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector 
of individual characteristics, including grade, ethnicity, gender, lunch status, time period of 
entry, and (sometimes) own MEAP score, and 𝛼𝑗 is a school-specific intercept. The parameter 
vector 𝜹𝒋 varies by school and relates how individual characteristics affect choice at each school. 
Because the choice set of schools varies by grade, Equation (2) is run separately for elementary 
school students, middle school students, and high school students. The choice set is complicated 
somewhat by two school openings in the estimation period (a new elementary school opens in 
2008 and a new middle school in 2009) and a shift of 6th grade from elementary school to 
middle school in 2009.35 To avoid difficulties in both estimation and interpretation, the 
estimation sample runs from 2003 through 2008 and excludes 6th graders. 
                                                 
33 It is important to note that higher test scores or more affluent students do not mean that a school is 
“stronger” or “better” than another; that is they do not capture value added, or the difference between how the same 
student would fare at different schools. Although this latter effect is presumably what parents care about, it is 
difficult to measure, even with extensive data, and parents may instead use aggregate statistics of a school an  
imperfect proxy for value added. 
34 More general mixed logit models that allow choice to be a function of characteristics of the schools and 
students (including what is called McFadden’s choice by economists and alternative-specific conditional logit by 
Stata; see Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p. 495) were also considered, but these models had difficulty converging. 
35 Three elementary schools—Edison, Washington, and Woods Lake—transition out of 6th grade earlier.  
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Table 6 shows the 16 elementary, 3 middle, and 3 high schools in KPS during the sample 
period, along with two socioeconomic variables: the average fraction of each school’s students 
participating in the federal lunch program and the school’s average standardized MEAP score, 
both for the period 2003–2005.36 Even though KPS as a whole has a higher percentage of low-
income students and lower MEAP scores than the state average, there is considerable variation 
across schools. At Woods Lake Elementary, for example, over 80 percent of students received 
lunch assistance and the average MEAP score was a full standard deviation below state average; 
at Indian Prairie Elementary, on the other hand, less than 30 percent participated in the lunch 
program and students scored about half a standard deviation above the state average. The next 
three columns show the empirical distribution of school choice among new students for three 
periods: 2003–2005, 2006, and 2007–2008. These unconditional probabilities suggest that the 
influx of new students in 2006 altered their school choices relative to their predecessors: in 
particular, Lincoln, Parkwood-Upjohn, and Maple Middle saw notable increases in their share. 
Interestingly, none of these schools ranked highly on the specified characteristics, although 
schools that were at the bottom of the distribution (e.g., Edison, Northeastern, Northglade, 
Milwood Middle, and Woods Lake) did lose share. 
                                                 
36 Official data are used for these measures, rather than the microdata, because the official numbers are 
more likely to be known by the public. (Using the microdata produces very similar results.) The lunch data are taken 
from official counts published by CEPI at https://www.michigan.gov/cepi/0,1607,7-113-21423_30451_36965---
,00.html. The construction of the MEAP scores is more involved, as official releases of school-level scale scores 
began only in 2007. Prior to that year, only the shares of students in each of four proficiency levels were released. 
To create a consistent scale score measure, I first regress school-level scale scores, pooled for 2007–2010, on the 
fraction in each proficiency level and a set of school dummies, and do this separately for each grade and test (math 
and reading). I create predicted values from these regressions (R2 measures are typically greater than 0.95), 
including for the out-of-sample periods 2003–2006. (That is, I impute scale scores for the period before the MEAP 
redesign as well.) The predicted scale scores are standardized to the 2005 state distribution, as described previously, 
and the simple average of these standardized scores, across grades and math and reading, is calculated for each 
school and year. 
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A more formal approach to examining changes in the choice distribution can be found in 
the last two columns, which present results from Equation (2). The estimates represent the 
marginal change in the probability of choosing a given school in 2006 (2007–2008) relative to 
2003–2005, controlling for grade, ethnicity, gender, and lunch status. (They illustrate whether 
schools became more or less attractive to the average student, whereas the unconditional 
probabilities conflate this effect with changes in the demographic composition of entrants.) In 
general, the story is quite similar: Lincoln and Maple Middle receive a large boost in share in 
2006, although Parkwood-Upjohn’s unconditional increase weakens somewhat once 
demographics are controlled, and Milwood Elementary’s increases. As noted, none of these 
schools has especially high average test scores or socioeconomic statistics; the schools that do, 
such as Indian Prairie, Winchell, and Hillside Middle, show no evidence of taking in a greater 
share of students in 2006—if anything, their shares decrease slightly. While Lincoln and Maple 
Middle are both magnet schools, and one might posit that this factor explains their share growth 
in 2006, Edison, Spring Valley, Washington, Woods Lake, and Woodward are also magnet 
schools (and with similar statistics), but they each lose share in 2006.  
The apparent lack of positive sorting in 2006 may be due to informational constraints, 
school capacity constraints, or other factors that families care about but which are not observed 
(e.g., a great principal). Some evidence that the last of these channels is not dominant, at least for 
elementary schools, can be found in the last column of Table 6. These results show that the 
elementary schools with the lowest test scores and highest poverty, Northglade and Woods Lake, 
saw the sharpest reduction in shares of new students in the 2007–2008 period, while schools that 
looked better on paper, King-Westwood and Prairie Ridge, experienced gains. The increase in 
positive sorting in the later period took place after the one-time surge in new students in 2006 
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(Figure 1), which may have created short-lived capacity constraints at certain schools.37 On the 
other hand, the increase in sorting also coincides with increased reporting of school test scores 
stemming from a redesign of the MEAP in 2005 (scores for which were not released until 2006). 
To investigate the possibility of capacity constraints that were ameliorated in subsequent 
years, Table 7 presents a matrix that illustrates how initial school choices of new students 
changed one year later. Within each panel, the three columns show the probability that the 
student was enrolled in the same school the following fall, the probability that she had changed 
to another KPS school, and the probability that she had left KPS. For example, among new 
students who entered Arcadia Elementary in 2003 or 2004, 64 percent were still enrolled in 
Arcadia the following year (2004 or 2005), 9 percent had switched schools, and 27 percent had 
exited the district.38 (These numbers, like the rest of those in the table, refer to entering students 
whose next grade is taught at the school of entry; grades for which transition to a new school 
would be expected the following year are excluded.) If crowding were an issue, new students in 
2006 would be less likely to have attended their first-choice school than previous new students, 
and, as a consequence, they would have been more likely to switch schools the following year. 
However, the evidence in support of this hypothesis is relatively weak. The aggregate switching 
rate for elementary schools is 11.6 percent for new entrants in 2003–2004 and 2006, and rises 
only slightly to 13.2 percent afterward. While schools with better statistics tend to see switching 
rates fall (King-Westwood, Prairie Ridge, Winchell), and those with worse statistics see their 
switching rates rise (Edison, Spring Valley, Washington), these institutions did not see a large 
influx of new students in 2006. The school that did, Lincoln, has its switching rate nearly 
                                                 
37 The simple correlation (for elementary schools) between lunch (MEAP scores) and sorting changes in 
2006 is 0.07 (−0.04); for sorting changes in 2007–2008, it is −0.25 (0.56). 
38 The astute reader will recognize that exit rates in Table 7 are higher than in Figure 2. The population of 
new entrants tends to be more mobile than the population of continuing students. 
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quintuple, from 3.3 percent to 15.8 percent. While this would appear to be strong support of 
crowding, it comes with a substantial caveat: Lincoln is a magnet school specializing in 
languages, and it was announced in the spring of 2007 that its popular Spanish immersion 
program would not continue the following fall because of logistic complications (Mack 2008). 
Thus, it is not clear how much of the increase in Lincoln’s switching rate for the 2006 cohort is 
due to Promise-induced crowding and how much is due to a(n) (independent) curricular change. 
While capacity constraints most likely explain some of the lack of positive sorting in 2006, they 
are not the clear driver. 
Information constraints, therefore, would seem to be predominant, but evidence to this 
effect is not particularly strong, either. It is normally thought that richer families are at least as 
well informed as poorer families when it comes to school choice (Chakrabarti and Roy 2010). 
However, new students who were not on the assisted lunch program exhibited negative sorting in 
2006 and (weakly) positive sorting in 2007 and 2008. Poorer students, in contrast, exhibited 
positive sorting in both periods, although the relationship strengthened after 2006 (Table A3). 
Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that students coming from other districts in Michigan would 
be better informed about school characteristics than those coming from elsewhere in the country, 
but both exhibit weak negative sorting in 2006, followed by positive sorting in the later period 
(Table A4).39 The absence of the expected socioeconomic or location gradient in school sorting 
behavior in 2006 does not necessarily imply that information constraints were not important; 
rather, the paucity of information about schools in the earlier period might have been severe 
enough to affect all groups roughly equally. Unfortunately, this conjecture cannot be tested. 
                                                 
39 Students with local origins are probably better informed still, but because they are less likely to have 
changed residences when entering KPS, they are more likely to be subject to catchment zones and have less choice. 
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Nonetheless, the main result is that new students who entered KPS the year after the 
Promise announcement, despite being of slightly higher socioeconomic status, did not 
differentially sort into schools with fewer poor students or higher test scores. New students who 
entered in 2007 or 2008, on the other hand, did exhibit positive sorting, and this increase over 
time was probably due to a combination of information and school capacity constraints in 2006 
that loosened in the following years.  
CONCLUSION 
While previous research has documented how the Kalamazoo Promise has increased 
enrollment in the KPS district, this paper has sought to qualify and quantify the characteristics of 
students who were induced to enter—or stay—in the district. In particular, it analyzes the origins 
and destinations, socioeconomic composition, and school-level sorting behavior associated with 
student flows around the time of the Promise announcement. These dimensions are more subtle 
than changes in the volume of students or measures of their individual success, but they are 
equally important to understand for communities exploring the feasibility of place-based 
scholarships as a local economic development tool. 
The majority of the students who entered KPS the year after the Promise was announced 
were from outside the district; fewer than a quarter were transfers from local private or charter 
schools. This suggests household migration into the district.40 In fact, a quarter of new students 
came from out of state, and these out-of-state migrants likely had economic effects on the entire 
                                                 
40 Subsequent work will analyze migration and real estate markets more directly. In preliminary analysis of 
migration using the American Community Survey, I have found a positive migration response into the Kalamazoo 
area in 2006 for households with children relative to those without; however, the estimates are not very precise. 
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Kalamazoo area.41 Over half of new students came from other Michigan districts, and most of 
these were from within the county. These latter students presumably changed housing locations, 
but because they came from the same labor market area, it is likely that their parents or guardians 
did not have to change jobs. Thus, the labor market response among these movers is likely to 
have been weaker than the housing market response. Conversely, because the proportion of 
exiting students going to neighboring districts fell from 80 percent to 50 percent in the years 
following the Promise announcement (even though the reduction in the number of exiting 
students grew larger), it is probable that the metropolitan labor market kept more jobs than it 
otherwise would have. 
New students who entered KPS in 2006 were more socioeconomically advantaged than 
previous new students, and this effect lasted through 2007 even though the volume of new 
students had returned to earlier levels. This selection was relatively modest, as the new students 
more closely resembled their incumbent peers, who still fall well below the state average on 
MEAP scores and income proxies, rather than the even more highly disadvantaged previous 
cohorts. This transitory positive effect on the composition of new students is tempered by 
suggestive evidence of a similar positive effect on the composition of exiting students. While the 
Promise may have attracted students from a greater socioeconomic stratum, its effectiveness at 
keeping them is more subdued. Because exit rates fell overall, more of these types of students 
stayed in the district, although poorer students were even more likely to stay. As these changes 
were too small to affect the makeup of the student body as a whole, composition is likely to play 
a minimal role in macro effects from Promise-type programs. 
                                                 
41 For example, parents of these students may have taken jobs throughout the metropolitan area, and their 
demand for goods and services would extend beyond school district boundaries. 
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The Promise also does not appear to have had any immediate impact on school or 
neighborhood sorting. New students entering KPS in subsequent years were more likely to 
choose schools that had fewer students on assisted lunch programs and higher MEAP scores, but 
it is unclear how much this difference can be attributed to the Promise rather than better 
knowledge about MEAP scores over time or a relaxation of binding capacity constraints in 2006. 
As there is little evidence that different types of students sorted differentially that year, it is not 
the case that the more advantaged students induced to enter because of the Promise 
disproportionately enrolled at schools with better statistics. Thus, the Promise itself probably had 
little influence on measures of diversity and inequality across schools, at least insofar as new 
students are concerned. 
Although this paper adds to our understanding of how place-based scholarships can affect 
local economic development through short-term behavioral changes of families with students, 
more research is needed on evaluating longer-term effects, particularly on the extent to which 
beneficiaries remain in the area for participation in the labor market (and the amount and types of 
postsecondary schooling they receive). These outcomes have been difficult to study because of 
data limitations and an insufficient time horizon, but both of these issues should be surmountable 
in the next few years.   
 
 
 
 
 
34 
Appendix 
 
 
35 
Table A1  New Students to KPS by Grade, Counterfactual, and Reason 
 K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total (1–12) 
2006 counterfactual           
     Other MI district 15 80 75 47 52 47 45 40 38 66 45 24 27 584 
     Outside of MI 9 21 30 33 20 25 16 25 7 37 25 9 19 266 
     Private 1 5 2 0 3 1 2 1 1 17 2 1 2 37 
     Charter 1 12 6 17 16 9 9 11 12 41 1 0 0 135 
     First school entry 350 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
     Other 318 12 6 5 2 6 6 7 9 24 11 7 21 116 
     Total 693 134 120 102 92 88 78 83 68 185 83 41 69 1,143 
               
2006 actual               
     Other MI district 20 94 102 105 70 69 72 64 75 110 46 33 33 873 
     Outside of MI 8 44 26 46 35 35 36 24 35 56 21 13 28 399 
     Private 3 15 10 10 6 8 8 4 5 18 5 1 0 90 
     Charter 1 32 16 23 14 22 17 17 12 44 0 0 0 197 
     First school entry 678 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
     Other 46 15 8 8 3 7 7 3 3 30 13 9 14 120 
     Total 756 202 162 192 128 141 140 112 130 259 85 56 75 1,682 
               
Difference, actual − counter           
     Other MI district 5 14 27 58 18 22 27 24 37 44 1 9 6 289 
     Outside of MI –1 23 –4 13 15 10 20 –1 28 19 –4 4 9 133 
     Private 2 10 8 10 3 7 6 3 4 1 3 0 –2 53 
     Charter 0 20 10 6 –2 13 8 6 0 3 –1 0 0 62 
     First school entry 328 –2 0 0 0 0 –1 0 0 1 0 0 0 –3 
     Other –272 3 2 3 1 1 1 –4 –6 6 2 2 –7 4 
     Total 63 68 42 90 36 53 62 29 62 74 2 15 6 539 
               
% share of difference               
     Other MI district  21 63 65 51 42 44 82 60 60 75 59 98 54 
     Outside of MI  34 –8 15 43 19 33 –2 45 25 –254 26 143 25 
     Private  15 19 11 8 13 10 11 6 1 200 0 –33 10 
     Charter  30 23 7 –5 24 13 22 –1 4 –42 0 –4 12 
     First school entry  –4 0 –1 –1 0 –1 0 0 1 0 0 0 –1 
     Other  4 4 3 4 2 2 –14 –10 8 121 16 –104 1 
     Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
NOTE: The “counterfactual” is based on a linear prediction estimated on years 2000–2005. The “Other” category includes students entering from home schooling and those 
returning from a juvenile facility or having dropped out. Shares may not sum to totals because of rounding. See text for more details. 
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Table A2  New and Exiting Students to KPS by Grade and Reason: Earlier Period 
 K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total (1–12) 
New Students               
1998–2002 (average)               
     Other MI district 13 62 57 50 50 47 40 44 46 63 37 30 20 551 
     Outside of MI 5 36 28 30 25 24 23 21 25 32 18 16 17 296 
     Private 1 8 4 4 5 5 4 8 7 28 6 5 2 87 
     Charter 2 21 21 16 17 17 15 15 5 6 0 0 0 133 
     First school entry 596 13 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 
     Other 64 13 8 11 11 8 11 7 8 34 17 12 10 149 
     Total 680 153 120 117 109 101 93 95 90 162 79 64 49 1,233 
               
Exiting Students              Total (K–11) 
1998–2001 (average)               
     Other MI district 34 39 36 35 34 32 24 28 29 38 20 14 5 360 
     Outside of MI 21 18 19 13 13 16 13 13 10 17 7 6 4 166 
     Private 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
     Charter 6 5 5 4 6 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 33 
     Dropout 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 31 33 24 15 88 
     Graduated 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 231 9 
     End of year 91 87 83 85 77 74 75 67 73 89 66 47 125 911 
     Other 4 2 1 2 2 2 2 4 10 33 27 28 33 117 
     Total 156 151 143 139 132 127 116 113 123 207 154 126 413 1,688 
               
Exit Rate (%)               
1998–2001 (average)               
     Other MI district 3.8 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.6 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.7 2.5 2.2 1.1 3.4 
     Outside of MI 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.6 
     Private 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
     Charter 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
     Dropout 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 3.0 4.1 3.7 3.3 0.8 
     Graduated 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 50.1 0.1 
     End of year 10.1 9.4 8.9 9.0 8.4 8.3 8.7 7.8 8.7 8.8 8.2 7.4 27.1 8.7 
     Other 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 1.2 3.3 3.3 4.4 7.2 1.1 
     Total 17.4 16.4 15.4 14.8 14.4 14.4 13.5 13.3 14.8 20.5 19.2 19.9 89.6 16.1 
NOTE: The “counterfactual” is based on a linear prediction estimated on years 2000–2005. The “Other” category includes students entering from home schooling and those 
returning from a juvenile facility or having dropped out. Shares may not sum to totals because of rounding. See text for more details. 
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Table A3  Multinomial Logit Estimation of Equation (2), Choice of School for New Entrants, By Lunch Status 
 Not on lunch program On lunch program 
A: Elementary P2003-2005 dP2006 dP2007-2008 P2003-2005 dP2006 dP2007-2008 
     Arcadia 0.042 –0.0074 0.0034 0.039 0.0048 0.0010 
     Edison 0.013 0.0085 0.0093 0.081 –0.0149 0.0121 
     Greenwood 0.029 0.0002 0.0043 0.028 –0.0084 –0.0011 
     Indian Prairie 0.116 –0.0101 –0.0100 0.024 0.0031 0.0039 
     King-Westwood 0.096 0.0022 0.0377** 0.057 0.0039 0.0003 
     Lincoln 0.024 0.0166** –0.0037 0.091 0.0271** 0.0096 
     Milwood 0.062 0.0165 –0.0105 0.092 0.0019 0.0204** 
     Northeastern 0.023 0.0096 0.0155* 0.081 –0.0084 –0.0129 
     Northglade 0.044 0.0027 –0.0170* 0.061 –0.0118 –0.0361** 
     Parkwood-Upjohn 0.106 0.0148 0.0148 0.053 0.0045 0.0117* 
     Prairie Ridge 0.084 0.0088 0.0329** 0.054 –0.0021 0.0100 
     Spring Valley 0.053 –0.0188* –0.0199** 0.052 0.0092 –0.0097 
     Washington 0.017 0.0038 0.0014 0.079 –0.0019 0.0119 
     Winchell 0.157 –0.0352* –0.0191 0.026 0.0036 0.0074 
     Woods Lake 0.082 –0.0082 –0.0287** 0.115 –0.0098 –0.0398** 
     Woodward 0.052 –0.0041 –0.0106 0.067 –0.0008 0.0113 
       
B: Middle       
     Hillside 0.381 –0.0833 0.0324 0.279 –0.0084 –0.1115** 
     Maple 0.339 0.1193* –0.0252 0.347 0.1379** 0.0770* 
     Milwood 0.280 –0.0360 –0.0072 0.374 –0.1295** 0.0344 
       
C: High       
     Central 0.404 0.1588** 0.1588** 0.421 0.0145 0.0504 
     Loy Norrix 0.504 –0.1246** –0.0503 0.477 0.0306 0.0144 
     Phoenix 0.092 –0.0342** –0.1085** 0.102 –0.0451** –0.0648** 
NOTE: The columns show marginal changes in probability for the selected demographic groups between 2003–2005 and the specified periods, controlling for grade, gender, 
ethnicity, and  lunch status. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05). See Table 6 for other notes. 
 
  
38 
Table A4  Multinomial Logit Estimation of Equation (2), Choice of School for New Entrants, By Origin 
 Other MI district Outside MI Other (Local) 
A: Elementary P2003-2005 dP2006 dP2007-2008 P2003-2005 dP2006 dP2007-2008 P2003-2005 dP2006 dP2007-2008 
     Arcadia 0.043 0.0087 0.0165 0.059 0.0096 –0.0009 0.036 –0.0031 –0.0018 
     Edison 0.066 0.0032 –0.0049 0.075 –0.1095** 0.0255 0.061 –0.0035 0.0129* 
     Greenwood 0.023 –0.0054 0.0152* 0.026 –0.0012 –0.0329* 0.032 –0.0068 –0.0033 
     Indian Prairie 0.032 –0.0084 0.0130 0.039 –0.0406* –0.0017 0.058 0.0058 –0.0070 
     King-Westwood 0.069 0.0048 0.0198 0.093 –0.0044 –0.0239 0.065 0.0031 0.0139* 
     Lincoln 0.045 0.0169 –0.0002 0.101 0.0846** –0.0395 0.079 0.0150 0.0130 
     Milwood 0.122 0.0041 0.0168 0.093 –0.0256 –0.0176 0.069 0.0180* 0.0128 
     Northeastern 0.088 –0.0132 –0.0226* 0.023 0.0379** 0.0132 0.064 –0.0087 0.0006 
     Northglade 0.036 –0.0023 –0.0262** — — — 0.064 –0.0030 –0.0257** 
     Parkwood-Upjohn 0.059 0.0129 0.0289** 0.072 –0.0035 0.0110 0.071 0.0099 0.0060 
     Prairie Ridge 0.092 –0.0320* –0.0118 0.078 –0.0190 0.0112 0.049 0.0196** 0.0279** 
     Spring Valley 0.068 0.0008 –0.0338** 0.008 0.0299** 0.0297** 0.053 –0.0072 –0.0131* 
     Washington 0.073 0.0153 0.0114 0.062 0.0132 0.0353* 0.057 –0.0076 0.0024 
     Winchell 0.052 0.0027 –0.0129 0.049 0.0047 0.0278 0.069 –0.0176* –0.0005 
     Woods Lake 0.090 –0.0105 –0.0135 0.173 –0.0095 –0.0781** 0.102 –0.0081 –0.0381** 
     Woodward 0.044 0.0024 0.0043 0.049 0.0333 0.0408** 0.073 –0.0057 –0.0001 
          
B: Middle          
     Hillside 0.240 0.0295 0.0124 0.339 –0.0485 –0.1999** 0.375 –0.1831** –0.0874 
     Maple 0.326 0.1589** 0.0256 0.375 0.1471* 0.1117 0.278 0.1012 0.0320 
     Milwood 0.434 –0.1884** –0.0381 0.286 –0.0987 0.0882 0.347 0.0818 0.0554 
          
C: High          
     Central 0.433 0.0496 0.1034** 0.483 0.1042* 0.0085 0.316 0.0543 0.1577** 
     Loy Norrix 0.479 –0.0175 –0.0058 0.468 –0.0740 0.0130 0.517 –0.0147 –0.0465 
     Phoenix 0.088 –0.0321* –0.0976** 0.049 –0.0302 –0.0215 0.167 –0.0396 –0.1113** 
NOTE: The columns show marginal changes in probability for the selected demographic groups between 2003–2005 and the specified periods, controlling for grade, gender, 
ethnicity, and  lunch status. The “Other” category includes students from private schools, charter schools, and homeschooling, as well as dropout returns and re-entrants from the 
criminal justice system. Entrants from outside Michigan to Northglade Elementary were too few to estimate reliably, and so they are omitted. Asterisks indicate statistical 
significance (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05). See Table 6 for other notes. 
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Table A5  Multinomial Logit Estimation of Equation (2), Choice of School for New Entrants, By MEAP 
 Lowest Tertile Middle Tertile Highest Tertile 
A: Elementary P2003-2005 dP2006 dP2007-2008 P2003-2005 dP2006 dP2007-2008 P2003-2005 dP2006 dP2007-2008 
     Arcadia 0.045 –0.0084 –0.0148** 0.050 0.0064 0.0023 0.099 –0.0167 –0.0200 
     Edison 0.094 –0.0203* –0.0082 0.041 0.0122 –0.0005 0.008 0.0066 0.0006 
     Greenwood 0.006 0.0038 –0.0024 0.009 0.0037 0.0047 0.008 0.0058 0.0059 
     Indian Prairie 0.008 –0.0022 –0.0006 0.024 –0.0061 0.0002 0.039 –0.0018 0.0059 
     King-Westwood 0.059 –0.0046 0.0084 0.110 –0.0092 0.0042 0.194 0.0099 –0.0081 
     Lincoln 0.111 0.0093 0.0160 0.081 –0.0140 –0.0289** 0.046 0.0028 –0.0284** 
     Milwood 0.094 0.0167 0.0177 0.096 –0.0093 0.0132 0.074 0.0034 0.0035 
     Northeastern 0.060 0.0015 –0.0107 0.059 0.0039 –0.0005 0.039 –0.0092 –0.0134 
     Northglade 0.054 –0.0127 –0.0064 0.017 0.0275** 0.0171 0.023 –0.0045 –0.0071 
     Parkwood-Upjohn 0.053 0.0063 0.0115 0.062 0.0107 0.0195 0.068 0.0240 0.0406** 
     Prairie Ridge 0.034 0.0032 0.0000 0.069 –0.0007 0.0033 0.093 –0.0019 0.0064 
     Spring Valley 0.090 –0.0036 –0.0029 0.072 –0.0051 –0.0193* 0.021 –0.0036 0.0016 
     Washington 0.082 0.0009 –0.0058 0.071 –0.0118 –0.0181 0.041 –0.0154* –0.0207** 
     Winchell 0.039 0.0008 –0.0054 0.100 –0.0048 –0.0107 0.169 –0.0020 0.0154 
     Woods Lake 0.111 –0.0057 –0.0120 0.074 0.0025 0.0186 0.031 0.0154 0.0322** 
     Woodward 0.062 0.0148 0.0157* 0.065 –0.0057 –0.0049 0.046 –0.0128 –0.0143 
          
B: Middle          
     Hillside 0.294 –0.0170 –0.0331* 0.398 –0.0501 –0.0413 0.558 –0.0894** –0.0420 
     Maple 0.351 0.0369 0.0087 0.383 –0.0285 –0.0283 0.321 0.0532 0.0414 
     Milwood 0.355 –0.0198 0.0243 0.220 0.0787** 0.0696** 0.121 0.0362 0.0006 
NOTE: The columns show marginal changes in probability for the selected demographic groups between 2005 and the specified periods, controlling for grade, gender, ethnicity, 
and  lunch status. Distributions reflect grades for which MEAP was tested (grades 3–5 for elementary; 7–8 for middle). Tertiles are relative to the statewide distribution in 2005. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05). See Table 6 for other notes. 
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Figure A1  New Fall Student Entrants to KPS, by Grade and Year 
 
 
Figure A2  Student Exit Rates from KPS, by Grade and Year 
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Figure A3  Free and Reduced-Price Lunch Status, by Grade, Entry Status, and Year 
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Figure A4A  Standardized Math MEAP Score Densities, KPS Students, by Entry Status and Year 
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Figure A4B  Standardized Reading MEAP Score Densities, KPS Students, by Entry Status and Year 
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Table 1  New Students to KPS by Grade, Time Period, and Reason 
 K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total (1–12) 
2003–2005 (average)               
     Other MI district 17 73 67 52 50 46 44 41 39 67 41 27 23 570 
     Outside of MI 8 24 29 28 24 23 20 25 13 36 23 13 18 277 
     Private 1 6 3 2 4 1 2 3 3 20 5 1 2 53 
     Charter 1 20 17 19 20 14 16 17 12 27 0 0 0 163 
     First school entry 364 6 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 
     Other 291 12 9 7 6 7 9 7 8 25 13 10 18 130 
     Total 682 141 126 109 103 92 92 93 75 175 82 51 62 1,200 
               
2006               
     Other MI district 20 94 102 105 70 69 72 64 75 110 46 33 33 873 
     Outside of MI 8 44 26 46 35 35 36 24 35 56 21 13 28 399 
     Private 3 15 10 10 6 8 8 4 5 18 5 1 0 90 
     Charter 1 32 16 23 14 22 17 17 12 44 0 0 0 197 
     First school entry 678 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
     Other 46 15 8 8 3 7 7 3 3 30 13 9 14 120 
     Total 756 202 162 192 128 141 140 112 130 259 85 56 75 1,682 
               
Difference, post less pre               
     Other MI district 3 21 35 53 20 23 28 23 36 43 5 6 10 303 
     Outside of MI 0 20 –3 18 11 12 16 –1 22 20 –2 0 10 122 
     Private 2 9 7 8 2 7 6 1 2 –2 0 0 –2 37 
     Charter 0 12 –1 4 –6 8 1 0 0 17 0 0 0 34 
     First school entry 314 –4 –1 –1 0 0 –1 0 0 1 0 0 0 –6 
     Other –245 3 –1 1 –3 0 –2 –4 –5 5 0 –1 –4 –10 
     Total 74 61 36 83 25 49 48 19 55 84 3 5 13 482 
               
% share of difference               
     Other MI district  35 96 63 80 48 58 119 64 52 200 120 73 63 
     Outside of MI  32 –8 21 45 24 33 –3 40 23 –88 0 75 25 
     Private  14 20 10 9 14 12 5 4 –3 –13 –7 –13 8 
     Charter  20 –3 5 –23 16 2 –2 1 20 –13 0 –3 7 
     First school entry  –7 –3 –1 –1 0 –1 0 0 1 0 0 0 –1 
     Other  5 –3 2 –11 –1 –4 –19 –10 6 12 –13 –32 –2 
     Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
NOTE: The “Other” category includes students entering from home schooling and those returning from a juvenile facility or having dropped out. Shares may not sum to totals 
because of rounding. See text for more details. 
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Table 2  Exiting Students from KPS by Grade, Time Period, and Reason 
 K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total (K–11) 
2002–2004 (average)               
     Other MI district 36 37 27 32 27 31 24 27 26 57 36 26 13 386 
     Outside of MI 20 17 14 15 13 15 18 16 13 23 9 4 7 176 
     Private 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 
     Charter 5 3 3 5 6 3 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 34 
     Dropout 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 31 28 21 13 84 
     Graduated 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 24 493 27 
     End of year 103 86 84 84 74 78 84 68 86 115 68 43 25 973 
     Other 5 2 2 3 3 3 2 5 8 27 20 12 22 93 
     Total 170 144 131 139 125 130 133 122 138 253 165 129 574 1,780 
               
2005-2009 (average)               
     Other MI district 31 33 28 22 17 16 17 19 18 42 19 13 13 275 
     Outside of MI 13 15 14 13 12 12 12 11 10 16 9 4 12 142 
     Private 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
     Charter 1 2 2 1 2 1 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 16 
     Dropout 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 43 25 21 24 94 
     Graduated 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 35 469 39 
     End of year 84 67 63 60 53 61 48 37 48 105 50 33 34 709 
     Other 3 3 2 1 2 1 2 5 7 24 10 6 15 65 
     Total 134 122 109 98 86 91 83 75 87 232 116 112 567 1,346 
               
Difference, post less pre               
     Other MI district –5 –4 0 –10 –10 –15 –7 –8 –8 –14 –17 –13 0 –111 
     Outside of MI –6 –2 –1 –2 –2 –3 –5 –5 –3 –6 0 0 4 –35 
     Private 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
     Charter –4 0 –1 –4 –5 –3 –1 0 –1 0 0 0 0 –18 
     Dropout 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 –1 0 12 –3 1 12 10 
     Graduated 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 –25 12 
     End of year –19 –19 –21 –24 –21 –17 –36 –31 –38 –10 –18 –10 10 –265 
     Other –2 1 0 –2 –1 –2 –1 0 –2 –3 –11 –6 –8 –28 
     Total –36 –23 –22 –41 –39 –39 –50 –47 –51 –21 –49 –17 –6 –434 
NOTE: The “Other” category includes students leaving for home schooling,  a juvenile facility, or unknown whereabouts. Shares may not sum to totals because of rounding. See 
text for more details. 
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Table 3  Exit Rates (Percentage) from KPS by Grade, Time Period, and Reason 
 K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total (K–11) 
2002–2004 (average)               
     Other MI district 4.0 4.2 3.3 3.9 3.4 3.8 2.9 3.2 3.2 5.5 4.8 4.2 2.2 3.9 
     Outside of MI 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.8 2.1 1.9 1.6 2.2 1.2 0.7 1.2 1.8 
     Private 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
     Charter 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
     Dropout 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 3.0 3.7 3.4 2.1 0.8 
     Graduated 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 4.0 81.4 0.3 
     End of year 11.3 9.8 10.1 11.3 9.2 9.4 10.2 8.2 10.6 11.2 9.1 7.0 4.1 9.8 
     Other 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.0 2.7 2.7 2.0 3.7 0.9 
     Total 18.7 16.5 15.7 17.0 15.4 15.8 16.1 14.6 17.0 24.7 22.1 21.3 94.6 17.9 
               
2005-2009 (average)               
     Other MI district 3.0 3.2 2.9 2.4 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.2 3.7 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.6 
     Outside of MI 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.2 0.6 1.9 1.3 
     Private 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
     Charter 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
     Dropout 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 3.8 3.5 3.5 4.0 0.9 
     Graduated 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 5.9 76.5 0.4 
     End of year 8.1 6.5 6.6 6.4 5.9 7.1 5.8 4.6 6.0 9.3 7.0 5.4 5.6 6.7 
     Other 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.8 2.2 1.3 1.0 2.4 0.6 
     Total 12.9 11.8 11.5 10.5 9.6 10.6 10 9.3 10.8 20.5 16.0 18.6 92.6 12.7 
               
Difference, post less pre               
     Other MI district –1.0 –1.0 –0.4 –1.5 –1.4 –1.9 –0.9 –0.9 –1.0 –1.8 –2.2 –2.1 0.0 –1.3 
     Outside of MI –0.9 –0.4 –0.3 –0.4 –0.3 –0.4 –0.7 –0.6 –0.3 –0.8 0.0 0.0 0.7 –0.4 
     Private 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
     Charter –0.4 –0.1 –0.2 –0.5 –0.6 –0.3 –0.1 0.0 –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.2 
     Dropout 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 0.0 0.8 –0.3 0.1 1.9 0.0 
     Graduated 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.9 –4.8 0.1 
     End of year –3.3 –3.3 –3.4 –3.9 –3.3 –2.4 –4.4 –3.6 –4.6 –1.9 –2.2 –1.6 1.6 –3.1 
     Other –0.3 0.1 0.0 –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 –0.1 0.0 –0.2 –0.5 –1.4 –1.0 –1.3 –0.3 
     Total –5.8 –4.6 –4.2 –6.5 –5.8 –5.2 –6.1 –5.3 –6.2 –4.1 –6.0 –2.7 –2.0 –5.2 
NOTE: The “Other” category includes students leaving for home schooling,  a juvenile facility, or unknown whereabouts. Shares may not sum to totals because of rounding. See 
text for more details. 
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Table 4  Estimation of Equation (1), New Entrants From Other Local MI Districts 
𝛾𝚥�  
Total K–12 
enrollment, fall 2005 
Δ enrollment, 
2006−2005 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
Climax-Scotts 668 –29 –0.66 –0.47 0.060 0.033 
   (0.23) (0.32)   
Comstock 2,696 –257 –1.27 –1.07 1.018 0.822 
   (0.25) (0.27)   
Galesburg-Augusta 1,231 –6 –0.88 –1.02 0.016 0.094 
   (0.25) (0.36)   
Gull Lake 2,935 –54 –0.13 –0.15 0.022 0.019 
   (0.14) (0.15)   
Parchment 1,971 –120 –0.07 –0.24 0.026 0.091 
   (0.19) (0.25)   
Portage 9,028 –217 0.13 0.06 –0.088 –0.043 
   (0.11) (0.13)   
Schoolcraft 1,201 12 –0.52 –0.78 –0.019 –0.025 
   (0.51) (0.51)   
Vicksburg 2,768 –49 0.94 0.75 –0.144 –0.112 
   (0.38) (0.39)   
KPS  10,212 1,016   0.891 0.879 
       
Exclude K?   No Yes   
N   169 156   
R2   0.840 0.802   
NOTE: Estimates shown in columns 1 and 2 are for 𝛾𝑗from OLS estimation of Equation (1) in the text for the eight districts in the KRESA besides KPS. Standard errors in 
parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions include grade-level fixed effects. Enrollment totals are from CEPI. The numbers in columns 3 and 4 represent the 
product of the estimates in column 1 (or column 2) and the 2006–2005 change in enrollment as a share of the total new entrants into KPS from other Michigan districts in 2006. 
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Table 5  Estimation of Equation (1), Exits to Other Local MI Districts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝛾𝚥�  𝛿𝚥�  𝛿𝚥� −  𝛾𝚥�  𝛾𝚥�  = 𝛿𝚥�    
       
Climax-Scotts 0.95 0.67 –0.28 0.32 0.047 0.120 
 (0.46) (0.53) (0.58) (0.48)   
Comstock 2.28 0.34 –1.94 0.59 0.999 0.194 
 (0.30) (0.21) (0.33) (0.22)   
Galesburg-Augusta 0.79 –0.08 –0.87 0.03 0.008 –0.008 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.45) (0.34)   
Gull Lake 0.43 –0.41 –0.85 –0.20 0.040 –0.052 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26)   
Parchment 0.21 –0.14 –0.35 0.26 0.043 –0.064 
 (0.35) (0.29) (0.41) (0.28)   
Portage –0.49 0.37 0.86 0.31 –0.181 0.248 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.25) (0.19)   
Schoolcraft 0.91 0.56 –0.35 0.50 –0.019 0.155 
 (0.78) (0.56) (0.87) (0.56)   
Vicksburg –1.65 –0.15 1.50 –0.35 –0.138 –0.062 
 (0.58) (0.35) (0.56) (0.35)   
     0.799 0.531 
       
N 156 156   
R2 0.629 0.569   
NOTE: Estimates shown in supercolumn (1) are for 𝛾𝑗and 𝛿𝑗  from OLS estimation of Equation (1) using the sum of students exiting from KPS to other Michigan school districts 
and those exiting between years as the dependent variable. Estimates in column 2 are based on the imposition that 𝛾𝑗 = 𝛿𝑗 , although this is rejected in the data. In both cases, the 
sample includes grades K–11. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions include grade-level fixed effects. The numbers in column 3 (column 
4) represent the product of the 𝛾𝚥�  (𝛿𝚥� ) estimates from supercolumn 1 and the change in enrollment between 2006 and 2005 (2010 and 2006) as a share of the total exiting students 
from KPS (to Michigan school districts and those exiting between years) in those periods.  
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Table 6  Multinomial Logit Estimation of Equation (2), Choice of School for New Entrants 
A: Elementary Lunch2003-2005 MEAP2003-2005 P2003-2005 P2006 P2007-2008 dP2006 dP2007-2008 
     Arcadia 0.649 –0.077 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.0001 0.0024 
     Edison 0.927 –0.515 0.063 0.049 0.069 –0.0074 0.0106* 
     Greenwood 0.663 –0.406 0.029 0.023 0.029 –0.0058 0.0001 
     Indian Prairie 0.286 0.478 0.050 0.051 0.051 –0.0025 –0.0013 
     King-Westwood 0.420 –0.118 0.069 0.078 0.085 0.0028 0.0129** 
     Lincoln 0.801 –0.696 0.073 0.092 0.074 0.0249** 0.0053 
     Milwood 0.702 –0.561 0.084 0.090 0.091 0.0084 0.0110 
     Northeastern 0.823 –0.775 0.065 0.056 0.058 –0.0032 –0.0036 
     Northglade 0.759 –1.288 0.056 0.046 0.029 –0.0062 –0.0295** 
     Parkwood-Upjohn 0.541 –0.540 0.068 0.082 0.084 0.0084 0.0130** 
     Prairie Ridge 0.566 –0.046 0.062 0.069 0.081 0.0009 0.0167** 
     Spring Valley 0.713 –0.788 0.052 0.049 0.038 –0.0005 –0.0139** 
     Washington 0.884 –0.357 0.061 0.056 0.066 0.0007 0.0090 
     Winchell 0.362 0.178 0.062 0.063 0.068 –0.0102 –0.0017 
     Woods Lake 0.812 –1.013 0.106 0.095 0.069 –0.0094 –0.0360** 
     Woodward 0.709 –0.380 0.063 0.058 0.066 –0.0010 0.0050 
        
B: Middle        
     Hillside 0.533 –0.156 0.301 0.266 0.260 –0.0363 –0.0617* 
     Maple 0.692 –0.581 0.341 0.490 0.378 0.1323** 0.0437 
     Milwood 0.754 –0.792 0.352 0.245 0.363 –0.0960** 0.0179 
        
C: High        
     Central 0.442 — 0.409 0.490 0.507 0.0757** 0.0940** 
     Loy Norrix 0.520 — 0.488 0.455 0.464 –0.0337 –0.0140 
     Phoenix 0.717 — 0.103 0.056 0.030 –0.0419** –0.0799** 
NOTE: The first column lists the 16 elementary, 3 middle, and 3 high schools in KPS during the sample period of 2003–2008. Two elementary schools, Greenwood and Indian 
Prairie, offer grades K–3 only. The second and third columns show the fraction of students on federal lunch programs and standardized MEAP scores at each school, averaged over 
the 2003–2005 period; see note 36 in the text for the construction of these variables. The next three columns show the empirical distribution of the choice of school for the years 
superscripted; within each panel, the numbers in each column (approximately) sum to one. The last two columns show marginal changes in probability between 2003–2005 and the 
specified periods, controlling for grade, gender, ethnicity, and  lunch status. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05). 
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Table 7  Delayed Sorting: Choice of School for New Entrants and One Year Later 
 Entered 2003–2004 Entered 2006 Entered 2007–2008 
A: Elementary Same school Diff. school Left KPS Same school Diff. school Left KPS Same school Diff. school Left KPS 
     Arcadia 0.641 0.087 0.272 0.677 0.108 0.215 0.676 0.148 0.176 
     Edison 0.534 0.124 0.342 0.539 0.179 0.282 0.580 0.188 0.232 
     Greenwood 0.500 0.278 0.222 0.613 0.161 0.226 0.543 0.157 0.300 
     Indian Prairie 0.677 0.062 0.262 0.766 0.065 0.169 0.768 0.088 0.144 
     King-Westwood 0.579 0.129 0.292 0.807 0.065 0.129 0.760 0.086 0.154 
     Lincoln 0.744 0.033 0.222 0.582 0.158 0.260 0.657 0.192 0.152 
     Milwood 0.623 0.141 0.236 0.643 0.126 0.231 0.579 0.197 0.224 
     Northeastern 0.533 0.127 0.340 0.629 0.112 0.258 0.617 0.169 0.214 
     Northglade 0.611 0.139 0.250 0.722 0.153 0.125 0.803 0.079 0.118 
     Parkwood-Upjohn 0.587 0.169 0.244 0.723 0.108 0.169 0.638 0.106 0.257 
     Prairie Ridge 0.649 0.113 0.238 0.651 0.083 0.266 0.687 0.103 0.210 
     Spring Valley 0.712 0.072 0.216 0.795 0.115 0.090 0.765 0.082 0.153 
     Washington 0.623 0.158 0.219 0.538 0.238 0.225 0.575 0.156 0.270 
     Winchell 0.707 0.076 0.217 0.920 0.010 0.070 0.833 0.061 0.106 
     Woods Lake 0.572 0.106 0.322 0.640 0.120 0.240 0.669 0.072 0.260 
     Woodward 0.640 0.116 0.245 0.663 0.120 0.217 0.616 0.215 0.169 
          
     Total 0.622 0.116 0.262 0.683 0.116 0.201 0.672 0.132 0.196 
          
B: Middle          
     Hillside 0.508 0.082 0.410 0.667 0.033 0.300 0.826 0.000 0.174 
     Maple 0.525 0.065 0.410 0.717 0.022 0.261 0.679 0.000 0.321 
     Milwood 0.453 0.063 0.484 0.722 0.056 0.222 0.556 0.056 0.389 
          
     Total 0.484 0.068 0.447 0.705 0.036 0.259 0.696 0.015 0.290 
NOTE: The first column lists the 16 elementary, 3 middle, and 3 high schools in KPS during the sample period of 2003–2008. The three columns within each panel show the 
fraction of students who entered each school as a new KPS student (row) who at the count day of the following year: were at the same school (first column), had switched to a 
different school (second column),or had left KPS (third column). Two elementary schools, Greenwood and Indian Prairie, offer grades K–3 only; these schools show transitions for 
grades K–2 only. Similarly, schools that range only through 5th grade for a given year do not include 5th graders in the transitions above. Finally, the middle school transitions in 
the last panel are for entrants in 2007 only, as a new middle school opened up in 2009, and several students were redistricted that year. 
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Figure 1  New Fall Student Entrants to KPS, by Grade and Year Interval 
 
 
Figure 2  Student Exit Rates from KPS, by Grade and Year Interval  
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Figure 3  Entry Counts to KPS, by Reason 
 
 
Figure 4  Composition of New Entrants to KPS 
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Figure 5  Exit Rates from KPS, by Reason 
 
 
Figure 6  Composition of Exits from KPS 
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Figure 7A  Free and Reduced-Price Lunch Status, by Grade Range, Entry Status, and Year 
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Figure 7B  Free and Reduced-Price Lunch Status, by Grade Range, Exit Status, and Year 
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Figure 8  Standardized MEAP Scores of KPS Students, by Entry Status and Year 
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Figure 9  Math MEAP Score Density Differences, KPS Students, by Entry Status and Year 
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Figure 10  Reading MEAP Score Density Differences, KPS Students, by Entry Status and Year 
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Figure 11  Reweighted Math MEAP Score Density Differences, by Entry Status and Year 
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Figure 12  Reweighted Reading MEAP Score Density Differences, by Entry Status and Year 
 
